1/* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support 2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. 3 * 4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. 5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. 6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation 7 * All Rights Reserved. 8 * 9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify 10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by 11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or 12 * (at your option) any later version. 13 * 14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, 15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of 16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the 17 * GNU General Public License for more details. 18 * 19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License 20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software 21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA 22 * 23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> 24 * 25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, 26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. 27 * 28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in 29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by 30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. 31 * 32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>, 33 * 2006. 34 * 35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was 36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. 37 * 38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional 39 * filesystem information. 40 * 41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> 42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. 43 */ 44 45#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt 46 47#include <linux/init.h> 48#include <asm/types.h> 49#include <linux/atomic.h> 50#include <linux/fs.h> 51#include <linux/namei.h> 52#include <linux/mm.h> 53#include <linux/export.h> 54#include <linux/slab.h> 55#include <linux/mount.h> 56#include <linux/socket.h> 57#include <linux/mqueue.h> 58#include <linux/audit.h> 59#include <linux/personality.h> 60#include <linux/time.h> 61#include <linux/netlink.h> 62#include <linux/compiler.h> 63#include <asm/unistd.h> 64#include <linux/security.h> 65#include <linux/list.h> 66#include <linux/tty.h> 67#include <linux/binfmts.h> 68#include <linux/highmem.h> 69#include <linux/syscalls.h> 70#include <asm/syscall.h> 71#include <linux/capability.h> 72#include <linux/fs_struct.h> 73#include <linux/compat.h> 74#include <linux/ctype.h> 75#include <linux/string.h> 76#include <uapi/linux/limits.h> 77 78#include "audit.h" 79 80/* flags stating the success for a syscall */ 81#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0 82#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1 83#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2 84 85/* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */ 86#define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500 87 88/* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */ 89#define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128 90 91/* number of audit rules */ 92int audit_n_rules; 93 94/* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */ 95int audit_signals; 96 97struct audit_aux_data { 98 struct audit_aux_data *next; 99 int type; 100}; 101 102#define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 103 104/* Number of target pids per aux struct. */ 105#define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16 106 107struct audit_aux_data_pids { 108 struct audit_aux_data d; 109 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 110 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 111 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 112 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 113 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS]; 114 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN]; 115 int pid_count; 116}; 117 118struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps { 119 struct audit_aux_data d; 120 struct audit_cap_data fcap; 121 unsigned int fcap_ver; 122 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap; 123 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap; 124}; 125 126struct audit_tree_refs { 127 struct audit_tree_refs *next; 128 struct audit_chunk *c[31]; 129}; 130 131static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask) 132{ 133 unsigned n; 134 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 135 return 0; 136 n = ctx->major; 137 138 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) { 139 case 0: /* native */ 140 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 141 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n)) 142 return 1; 143 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 144 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n)) 145 return 1; 146 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 147 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n)) 148 return 1; 149 return 0; 150 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ 151 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && 152 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n)) 153 return 1; 154 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) && 155 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n)) 156 return 1; 157 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) && 158 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n)) 159 return 1; 160 return 0; 161 case 2: /* open */ 162 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]); 163 case 3: /* openat */ 164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]); 165 case 4: /* socketcall */ 166 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND); 167 case 5: /* execve */ 168 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC; 169 default: 170 return 0; 171 } 172} 173 174static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val) 175{ 176 struct audit_names *n; 177 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val; 178 179 if (unlikely(!ctx)) 180 return 0; 181 182 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 183 if ((n->ino != -1) && 184 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode)) 185 return 1; 186 } 187 188 return 0; 189} 190 191/* 192 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *; 193 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data. 194 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees. 195 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL, 196 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously, 197 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself. 198 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff. 199 */ 200 201#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 202static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx) 203{ 204 if (!ctx->prio) { 205 ctx->prio = 1; 206 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; 207 } 208} 209 210static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk) 211{ 212 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 213 int left = ctx->tree_count; 214 if (likely(left)) { 215 p->c[--left] = chunk; 216 ctx->tree_count = left; 217 return 1; 218 } 219 if (!p) 220 return 0; 221 p = p->next; 222 if (p) { 223 p->c[30] = chunk; 224 ctx->trees = p; 225 ctx->tree_count = 30; 226 return 1; 227 } 228 return 0; 229} 230 231static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 232{ 233 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees; 234 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL); 235 if (!ctx->trees) { 236 ctx->trees = p; 237 return 0; 238 } 239 if (p) 240 p->next = ctx->trees; 241 else 242 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees; 243 ctx->tree_count = 31; 244 return 1; 245} 246#endif 247 248static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, 249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count) 250{ 251#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 252 struct audit_tree_refs *q; 253 int n; 254 if (!p) { 255 /* we started with empty chain */ 256 p = ctx->first_trees; 257 count = 31; 258 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */ 259 if (!p) 260 return; 261 } 262 n = count; 263 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) { 264 while (n--) { 265 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 266 q->c[n] = NULL; 267 } 268 } 269 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) { 270 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]); 271 q->c[n] = NULL; 272 } 273 ctx->trees = p; 274 ctx->tree_count = count; 275#endif 276} 277 278static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx) 279{ 280 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q; 281 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) { 282 q = p->next; 283 kfree(p); 284 } 285} 286 287static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree) 288{ 289#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 290 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 291 int n; 292 if (!tree) 293 return 0; 294 /* full ones */ 295 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) { 296 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++) 297 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 298 return 1; 299 } 300 /* partial */ 301 if (p) { 302 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++) 303 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree)) 304 return 1; 305 } 306#endif 307 return 0; 308} 309 310static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid, 311 struct audit_names *name, 312 struct audit_field *f, 313 struct audit_context *ctx) 314{ 315 struct audit_names *n; 316 int rc; 317 318 if (name) { 319 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid); 320 if (rc) 321 return rc; 322 } 323 324 if (ctx) { 325 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 326 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid); 327 if (rc) 328 return rc; 329 } 330 } 331 return 0; 332} 333 334static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid, 335 struct audit_names *name, 336 struct audit_field *f, 337 struct audit_context *ctx) 338{ 339 struct audit_names *n; 340 int rc; 341 342 if (name) { 343 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid); 344 if (rc) 345 return rc; 346 } 347 348 if (ctx) { 349 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 350 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid); 351 if (rc) 352 return rc; 353 } 354 } 355 return 0; 356} 357 358static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk, 359 const struct cred *cred, 360 struct audit_field *f, 361 struct audit_context *ctx, 362 struct audit_names *name) 363{ 364 switch (f->val) { 365 /* process to file object comparisons */ 366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID: 367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx); 368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID: 369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx); 370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 371 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx); 372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 373 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx); 374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 375 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx); 376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx); 378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx); 380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID: 381 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx); 382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID: 383 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx); 384 /* uid comparisons */ 385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID: 386 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid); 387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID: 388 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid); 389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID: 390 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid); 391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID: 392 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 393 /* auid comparisons */ 394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID: 395 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid); 396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID: 397 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid); 398 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID: 399 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 400 /* euid comparisons */ 401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID: 402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid); 403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID: 404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 405 /* suid comparisons */ 406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID: 407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid); 408 /* gid comparisons */ 409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID: 410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid); 411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID: 412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid); 413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID: 414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 415 /* egid comparisons */ 416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID: 417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid); 418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID: 419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 420 /* sgid comparison */ 421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID: 422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid); 423 default: 424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n"); 425 return 0; 426 } 427 return 0; 428} 429 430/* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */ 431/* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 432 * otherwise. 433 * 434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are 435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are 436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock. 437 */ 438static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, 439 struct audit_krule *rule, 440 struct audit_context *ctx, 441 struct audit_names *name, 442 enum audit_state *state, 443 bool task_creation) 444{ 445 const struct cred *cred; 446 int i, need_sid = 1; 447 u32 sid; 448 449 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation); 450 451 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { 452 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; 453 struct audit_names *n; 454 int result = 0; 455 pid_t pid; 456 457 switch (f->type) { 458 case AUDIT_PID: 459 pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); 460 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); 461 break; 462 case AUDIT_PPID: 463 if (ctx) { 464 if (!ctx->ppid) 465 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk); 466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val); 467 } 468 break; 469 case AUDIT_UID: 470 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid); 471 break; 472 case AUDIT_EUID: 473 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid); 474 break; 475 case AUDIT_SUID: 476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid); 477 break; 478 case AUDIT_FSUID: 479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid); 480 break; 481 case AUDIT_GID: 482 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid); 483 if (f->op == Audit_equal) { 484 if (!result) 485 result = in_group_p(f->gid); 486 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { 487 if (result) 488 result = !in_group_p(f->gid); 489 } 490 break; 491 case AUDIT_EGID: 492 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid); 493 if (f->op == Audit_equal) { 494 if (!result) 495 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid); 496 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) { 497 if (result) 498 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid); 499 } 500 break; 501 case AUDIT_SGID: 502 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid); 503 break; 504 case AUDIT_FSGID: 505 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid); 506 break; 507 case AUDIT_PERS: 508 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); 509 break; 510 case AUDIT_ARCH: 511 if (ctx) 512 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); 513 break; 514 515 case AUDIT_EXIT: 516 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) 517 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); 518 break; 519 case AUDIT_SUCCESS: 520 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { 521 if (f->val) 522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); 523 else 524 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); 525 } 526 break; 527 case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: 528 if (name) { 529 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || 530 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) 531 ++result; 532 } else if (ctx) { 533 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 534 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || 535 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { 536 ++result; 537 break; 538 } 539 } 540 } 541 break; 542 case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: 543 if (name) { 544 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) || 545 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val)) 546 ++result; 547 } else if (ctx) { 548 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 549 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) || 550 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) { 551 ++result; 552 break; 553 } 554 } 555 } 556 break; 557 case AUDIT_INODE: 558 if (name) 559 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val); 560 else if (ctx) { 561 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 562 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) { 563 ++result; 564 break; 565 } 566 } 567 } 568 break; 569 case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: 570 if (name) { 571 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid); 572 } else if (ctx) { 573 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 574 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) { 575 ++result; 576 break; 577 } 578 } 579 } 580 break; 581 case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: 582 if (name) { 583 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid); 584 } else if (ctx) { 585 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 586 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) { 587 ++result; 588 break; 589 } 590 } 591 } 592 break; 593 case AUDIT_WATCH: 594 if (name) 595 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev); 596 break; 597 case AUDIT_DIR: 598 if (ctx) 599 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree); 600 break; 601 case AUDIT_LOGINUID: 602 result = 0; 603 if (ctx) 604 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid); 605 break; 606 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: 607 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val); 608 break; 609 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: 610 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: 611 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: 612 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: 613 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: 614 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating 615 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a 616 match for now to avoid losing information that 617 may be wanted. An error message will also be 618 logged upon error */ 619 if (f->lsm_rule) { 620 if (need_sid) { 621 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid); 622 need_sid = 0; 623 } 624 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type, 625 f->op, 626 f->lsm_rule, 627 ctx); 628 } 629 break; 630 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: 631 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: 632 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: 633 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: 634 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: 635 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR 636 also applies here */ 637 if (f->lsm_rule) { 638 /* Find files that match */ 639 if (name) { 640 result = security_audit_rule_match( 641 name->osid, f->type, f->op, 642 f->lsm_rule, ctx); 643 } else if (ctx) { 644 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 645 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type, 646 f->op, f->lsm_rule, 647 ctx)) { 648 ++result; 649 break; 650 } 651 } 652 } 653 /* Find ipc objects that match */ 654 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC) 655 break; 656 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid, 657 f->type, f->op, 658 f->lsm_rule, ctx)) 659 ++result; 660 } 661 break; 662 case AUDIT_ARG0: 663 case AUDIT_ARG1: 664 case AUDIT_ARG2: 665 case AUDIT_ARG3: 666 if (ctx) 667 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); 668 break; 669 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: 670 /* ignore this field for filtering */ 671 result = 1; 672 break; 673 case AUDIT_PERM: 674 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val); 675 break; 676 case AUDIT_FILETYPE: 677 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val); 678 break; 679 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: 680 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name); 681 break; 682 } 683 if (!result) 684 return 0; 685 } 686 687 if (ctx) { 688 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio) 689 return 0; 690 if (rule->filterkey) { 691 kfree(ctx->filterkey); 692 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 693 } 694 ctx->prio = rule->prio; 695 } 696 switch (rule->action) { 697 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; 698 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; 699 } 700 return 1; 701} 702 703/* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is 704 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task 705 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. 706 */ 707static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key) 708{ 709 struct audit_entry *e; 710 enum audit_state state; 711 712 rcu_read_lock(); 713 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { 714 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL, 715 &state, true)) { 716 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 717 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC); 718 rcu_read_unlock(); 719 return state; 720 } 721 } 722 rcu_read_unlock(); 723 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; 724} 725 726static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val) 727{ 728 int word, bit; 729 730 if (val > 0xffffffff) 731 return false; 732 733 word = AUDIT_WORD(val); 734 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE) 735 return false; 736 737 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val); 738 739 return rule->mask[word] & bit; 740} 741 742/* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the 743 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is 744 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit 745 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). 746 */ 747static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, 748 struct audit_context *ctx, 749 struct list_head *list) 750{ 751 struct audit_entry *e; 752 enum audit_state state; 753 754 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) 755 return AUDIT_DISABLED; 756 757 rcu_read_lock(); 758 if (!list_empty(list)) { 759 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 760 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && 761 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, 762 &state, false)) { 763 rcu_read_unlock(); 764 ctx->current_state = state; 765 return state; 766 } 767 } 768 } 769 rcu_read_unlock(); 770 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; 771} 772 773/* 774 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match. 775 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash 776 */ 777static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk, 778 struct audit_names *n, 779 struct audit_context *ctx) { 780 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino); 781 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; 782 struct audit_entry *e; 783 enum audit_state state; 784 785 if (list_empty(list)) 786 return 0; 787 788 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { 789 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) && 790 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) { 791 ctx->current_state = state; 792 return 1; 793 } 794 } 795 796 return 0; 797} 798 799/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been 800 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash 801 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names. 802 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall(). 803 */ 804void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx) 805{ 806 struct audit_names *n; 807 808 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) 809 return; 810 811 rcu_read_lock(); 812 813 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) { 814 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx)) 815 break; 816 } 817 rcu_read_unlock(); 818} 819 820/* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */ 821static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk, 822 int return_valid, 823 long return_code) 824{ 825 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; 826 827 if (!context) 828 return NULL; 829 context->return_valid = return_valid; 830 831 /* 832 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual 833 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific 834 * signal handlers 835 * 836 * This is actually a test for: 837 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) || 838 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) 839 * 840 * but is faster than a bunch of || 841 */ 842 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) && 843 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) && 844 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD)) 845 context->return_code = -EINTR; 846 else 847 context->return_code = return_code; 848 849 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) { 850 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); 851 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context); 852 } 853 854 tsk->audit_context = NULL; 855 return context; 856} 857 858static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context) 859{ 860 kfree(context->proctitle.value); 861 context->proctitle.value = NULL; 862 context->proctitle.len = 0; 863} 864 865static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) 866{ 867 struct audit_names *n, *next; 868 869 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) { 870 list_del(&n->list); 871 if (n->name) 872 putname(n->name); 873 if (n->should_free) 874 kfree(n); 875 } 876 context->name_count = 0; 877 path_put(&context->pwd); 878 context->pwd.dentry = NULL; 879 context->pwd.mnt = NULL; 880} 881 882static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) 883{ 884 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 885 886 while ((aux = context->aux)) { 887 context->aux = aux->next; 888 kfree(aux); 889 } 890 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) { 891 context->aux_pids = aux->next; 892 kfree(aux); 893 } 894} 895 896static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) 897{ 898 struct audit_context *context; 899 900 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL); 901 if (!context) 902 return NULL; 903 context->state = state; 904 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; 905 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees); 906 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list); 907 return context; 908} 909 910/** 911 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task 912 * @tsk: task 913 * 914 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context 915 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the 916 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is 917 * needed. 918 */ 919int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) 920{ 921 struct audit_context *context; 922 enum audit_state state; 923 char *key = NULL; 924 925 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled)) 926 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ 927 928 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key); 929 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) { 930 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); 931 return 0; 932 } 933 934 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { 935 kfree(key); 936 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); 937 return -ENOMEM; 938 } 939 context->filterkey = key; 940 941 tsk->audit_context = context; 942 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); 943 return 0; 944} 945 946static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) 947{ 948 audit_free_names(context); 949 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); 950 free_tree_refs(context); 951 audit_free_aux(context); 952 kfree(context->filterkey); 953 kfree(context->sockaddr); 954 audit_proctitle_free(context); 955 kfree(context); 956} 957 958static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, 959 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid, 960 u32 sid, char *comm) 961{ 962 struct audit_buffer *ab; 963 char *ctx = NULL; 964 u32 len; 965 int rc = 0; 966 967 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID); 968 if (!ab) 969 return rc; 970 971 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, 972 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), 973 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); 974 if (sid) { 975 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) { 976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)"); 977 rc = 1; 978 } else { 979 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); 980 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 981 } 982 } 983 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm="); 984 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm); 985 audit_log_end(ab); 986 987 return rc; 988} 989 990/* 991 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't 992 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being 993 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary) 994 * 995 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when 996 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting 997 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to 998 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space 999 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was. 1000 */ 1001static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context, 1002 struct audit_buffer **ab, 1003 int arg_num, 1004 size_t *len_sent, 1005 const char __user *p, 1006 char *buf) 1007{ 1008 char arg_num_len_buf[12]; 1009 const char __user *tmp_p = p; 1010 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */ 1011 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5; 1012 size_t len, len_left, to_send; 1013 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; 1014 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0; 1015 int ret; 1016 1017 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */ 1018 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1; 1019 1020 /* 1021 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings 1022 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar 1023 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created 1024 * any. 1025 */ 1026 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) { 1027 WARN_ON(1); 1028 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1029 return -1; 1030 } 1031 1032 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */ 1033 do { 1034 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN) 1035 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN; 1036 else 1037 to_send = len_left; 1038 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send); 1039 /* 1040 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just 1041 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user- 1042 * space yet. 1043 */ 1044 if (ret) { 1045 WARN_ON(1); 1046 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1047 return -1; 1048 } 1049 buf[to_send] = '\0'; 1050 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send); 1051 if (has_cntl) { 1052 /* 1053 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only 1054 * send half as much in each message 1055 */ 1056 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2; 1057 break; 1058 } 1059 len_left -= to_send; 1060 tmp_p += to_send; 1061 } while (len_left > 0); 1062 1063 len_left = len; 1064 1065 if (len > max_execve_audit_len) 1066 too_long = 1; 1067 1068 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */ 1069 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) { 1070 int room_left; 1071 1072 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len) 1073 to_send = max_execve_audit_len; 1074 else 1075 to_send = len_left; 1076 1077 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */ 1078 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent; 1079 if (has_cntl) 1080 room_left -= (to_send * 2); 1081 else 1082 room_left -= to_send; 1083 if (room_left < 0) { 1084 *len_sent = 0; 1085 audit_log_end(*ab); 1086 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE); 1087 if (!*ab) 1088 return 0; 1089 } 1090 1091 /* 1092 * first record needs to say how long the original string was 1093 * so we can be sure nothing was lost. 1094 */ 1095 if ((i == 0) && (too_long)) 1096 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num, 1097 has_cntl ? 2*len : len); 1098 1099 /* 1100 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already 1101 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters 1102 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user 1103 */ 1104 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len) 1105 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send); 1106 else 1107 ret = 0; 1108 if (ret) { 1109 WARN_ON(1); 1110 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0); 1111 return -1; 1112 } 1113 buf[to_send] = '\0'; 1114 1115 /* actually log it */ 1116 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num); 1117 if (too_long) 1118 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i); 1119 audit_log_format(*ab, "="); 1120 if (has_cntl) 1121 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send); 1122 else 1123 audit_log_string(*ab, buf); 1124 1125 p += to_send; 1126 len_left -= to_send; 1127 *len_sent += arg_num_len; 1128 if (has_cntl) 1129 *len_sent += to_send * 2; 1130 else 1131 *len_sent += to_send; 1132 } 1133 /* include the null we didn't log */ 1134 return len + 1; 1135} 1136 1137static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context, 1138 struct audit_buffer **ab) 1139{ 1140 int i, len; 1141 size_t len_sent = 0; 1142 const char __user *p; 1143 char *buf; 1144 1145 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start; 1146 1147 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc); 1148 1149 /* 1150 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just 1151 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size 1152 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg() 1153 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe. 1154 */ 1155 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL); 1156 if (!buf) { 1157 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string"); 1158 return; 1159 } 1160 1161 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) { 1162 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i, 1163 &len_sent, p, buf); 1164 if (len <= 0) 1165 break; 1166 p += len; 1167 } 1168 kfree(buf); 1169} 1170 1171static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) 1172{ 1173 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1174 int i; 1175 1176 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type); 1177 if (!ab) 1178 return; 1179 1180 switch (context->type) { 1181 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { 1182 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs; 1183 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs); 1184 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++) 1185 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, 1186 context->socketcall.args[i]); 1187 break; } 1188 case AUDIT_IPC: { 1189 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid; 1190 1191 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", 1192 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid), 1193 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), 1194 context->ipc.mode); 1195 if (osid) { 1196 char *ctx = NULL; 1197 u32 len; 1198 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) { 1199 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid); 1200 *call_panic = 1; 1201 } else { 1202 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx); 1203 security_release_secctx(ctx, len); 1204 } 1205 } 1206 if (context->ipc.has_perm) { 1207 audit_log_end(ab); 1208 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, 1209 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM); 1210 if (unlikely(!ab)) 1211 return; 1212 audit_log_format(ab, 1213 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho", 1214 context->ipc.qbytes, 1215 context->ipc.perm_uid, 1216 context->ipc.perm_gid, 1217 context->ipc.perm_mode); 1218 } 1219 break; } 1220 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: { 1221 audit_log_format(ab, 1222 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld " 1223 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld", 1224 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode, 1225 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags, 1226 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg, 1227 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize, 1228 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs); 1229 break; } 1230 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: { 1231 audit_log_format(ab, 1232 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u " 1233 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld", 1234 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes, 1235 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len, 1236 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio, 1237 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec, 1238 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec); 1239 break; } 1240 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: { 1241 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d", 1242 context->mq_notify.mqdes, 1243 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo); 1244 break; } 1245 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: { 1246 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat; 1247 audit_log_format(ab, 1248 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld " 1249 "mq_curmsgs=%ld ", 1250 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes, 1251 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg, 1252 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs); 1253 break; } 1254 case AUDIT_CAPSET: { 1255 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid); 1256 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable); 1257 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted); 1258 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective); 1259 break; } 1260 case AUDIT_MMAP: { 1261 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd, 1262 context->mmap.flags); 1263 break; } 1264 case AUDIT_EXECVE: { 1265 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab); 1266 break; } 1267 } 1268 audit_log_end(ab); 1269} 1270 1271static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len) 1272{ 1273 char *end = proctitle + len - 1; 1274 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end)) 1275 end--; 1276 1277 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */ 1278 len = end - proctitle + 1; 1279 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0; 1280 return len; 1281} 1282 1283static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk, 1284 struct audit_context *context) 1285{ 1286 int res; 1287 char *buf; 1288 char *msg = "(null)"; 1289 int len = strlen(msg); 1290 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1291 1292 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE); 1293 if (!ab) 1294 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */ 1295 1296 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle="); 1297 1298 /* Not cached */ 1299 if (!context->proctitle.value) { 1300 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL); 1301 if (!buf) 1302 goto out; 1303 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */ 1304 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN); 1305 if (res == 0) { 1306 kfree(buf); 1307 goto out; 1308 } 1309 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res); 1310 if (res == 0) { 1311 kfree(buf); 1312 goto out; 1313 } 1314 context->proctitle.value = buf; 1315 context->proctitle.len = res; 1316 } 1317 msg = context->proctitle.value; 1318 len = context->proctitle.len; 1319out: 1320 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len); 1321 audit_log_end(ab); 1322} 1323 1324static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk) 1325{ 1326 int i, call_panic = 0; 1327 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1328 struct audit_aux_data *aux; 1329 struct audit_names *n; 1330 1331 /* tsk == current */ 1332 context->personality = tsk->personality; 1333 1334 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL); 1335 if (!ab) 1336 return; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1337 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", 1338 context->arch, context->major); 1339 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) 1340 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); 1341 if (context->return_valid) 1342 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", 1343 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", 1344 context->return_code); 1345 1346 audit_log_format(ab, 1347 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d", 1348 context->argv[0], 1349 context->argv[1], 1350 context->argv[2], 1351 context->argv[3], 1352 context->name_count); 1353 1354 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk); 1355 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey); 1356 audit_log_end(ab); 1357 1358 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1359 1360 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type); 1361 if (!ab) 1362 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ 1363 1364 switch (aux->type) { 1365 1366 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: { 1367 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux; 1368 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver); 1369 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted); 1370 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable); 1371 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE); 1372 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted); 1373 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable); 1374 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective); 1375 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted); 1376 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable); 1377 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective); 1378 break; } 1379 1380 } 1381 audit_log_end(ab); 1382 } 1383 1384 if (context->type) 1385 show_special(context, &call_panic); 1386 1387 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) { 1388 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR); 1389 if (ab) { 1390 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d", 1391 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]); 1392 audit_log_end(ab); 1393 } 1394 } 1395 1396 if (context->sockaddr_len) { 1397 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR); 1398 if (ab) { 1399 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); 1400 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr, 1401 context->sockaddr_len); 1402 audit_log_end(ab); 1403 } 1404 } 1405 1406 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) { 1407 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux; 1408 1409 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++) 1410 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i], 1411 axs->target_auid[i], 1412 axs->target_uid[i], 1413 axs->target_sessionid[i], 1414 axs->target_sid[i], 1415 axs->target_comm[i])) 1416 call_panic = 1; 1417 } 1418 1419 if (context->target_pid && 1420 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid, 1421 context->target_auid, context->target_uid, 1422 context->target_sessionid, 1423 context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) 1424 call_panic = 1; 1425 1426 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) { 1427 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD); 1428 if (ab) { 1429 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd); 1430 audit_log_end(ab); 1431 } 1432 } 1433 1434 i = 0; 1435 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1436 if (n->hidden) 1437 continue; 1438 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic); 1439 } 1440 1441 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context); 1442 1443 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ 1444 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE); 1445 if (ab) 1446 audit_log_end(ab); 1447 if (call_panic) 1448 audit_panic("error converting sid to string"); 1449} 1450 1451/** 1452 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context 1453 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free 1454 * 1455 * Called from copy_process and do_exit 1456 */ 1457void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) 1458{ 1459 struct audit_context *context; 1460 1461 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0); 1462 if (!context) 1463 return; 1464 1465 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit 1466 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. 1467 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this 1468 * in the context of the idle thread */ 1469 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */ 1470 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 1471 audit_log_exit(context, tsk); 1472 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 1473 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); 1474 1475 audit_free_context(context); 1476} 1477 1478/** 1479 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry 1480 * @major: major syscall type (function) 1481 * @a1: additional syscall register 1 1482 * @a2: additional syscall register 2 1483 * @a3: additional syscall register 3 1484 * @a4: additional syscall register 4 1485 * 1486 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the 1487 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or 1488 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the 1489 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, 1490 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it 1491 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it 1492 * be written). 1493 */ 1494void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, 1495 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) 1496{ 1497 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 1498 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; 1499 enum audit_state state; 1500 1501 if (!context) 1502 return; 1503 1504 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); 1505 1506 if (!audit_enabled) 1507 return; 1508 1509 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(); 1510 context->major = major; 1511 context->argv[0] = a1; 1512 context->argv[1] = a2; 1513 context->argv[2] = a3; 1514 context->argv[3] = a4; 1515 1516 state = context->state; 1517 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules; 1518 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) { 1519 context->prio = 0; 1520 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); 1521 } 1522 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) 1523 return; 1524 1525 context->serial = 0; 1526 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; 1527 context->in_syscall = 1; 1528 context->current_state = state; 1529 context->ppid = 0; 1530} 1531 1532/** 1533 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call 1534 * @success: success value of the syscall 1535 * @return_code: return value of the syscall 1536 * 1537 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as 1538 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from 1539 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit 1540 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, 1541 * free the names stored from getname(). 1542 */ 1543void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) 1544{ 1545 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 1546 struct audit_context *context; 1547 1548 if (success) 1549 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS; 1550 else 1551 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE; 1552 1553 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code); 1554 if (!context) 1555 return; 1556 1557 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) 1558 audit_log_exit(context, tsk); 1559 1560 context->in_syscall = 0; 1561 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0; 1562 1563 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees)) 1564 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees); 1565 1566 audit_free_names(context); 1567 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0); 1568 audit_free_aux(context); 1569 context->aux = NULL; 1570 context->aux_pids = NULL; 1571 context->target_pid = 0; 1572 context->target_sid = 0; 1573 context->sockaddr_len = 0; 1574 context->type = 0; 1575 context->fds[0] = -1; 1576 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) { 1577 kfree(context->filterkey); 1578 context->filterkey = NULL; 1579 } 1580 tsk->audit_context = context; 1581} 1582 1583static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode) 1584{ 1585#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 1586 struct audit_context *context; 1587 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 1588 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 1589 int count; 1590 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) 1591 return; 1592 context = current->audit_context; 1593 p = context->trees; 1594 count = context->tree_count; 1595 rcu_read_lock(); 1596 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 1597 rcu_read_unlock(); 1598 if (!chunk) 1599 return; 1600 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) 1601 return; 1602 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) { 1603 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 1604 audit_set_auditable(context); 1605 audit_put_chunk(chunk); 1606 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1607 return; 1608 } 1609 put_tree_ref(context, chunk); 1610#endif 1611} 1612 1613static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry) 1614{ 1615#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE 1616 struct audit_context *context; 1617 struct audit_tree_refs *p; 1618 const struct dentry *d, *parent; 1619 struct audit_chunk *drop; 1620 unsigned long seq; 1621 int count; 1622 1623 context = current->audit_context; 1624 p = context->trees; 1625 count = context->tree_count; 1626retry: 1627 drop = NULL; 1628 d = dentry; 1629 rcu_read_lock(); 1630 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock); 1631 for(;;) { 1632 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d); 1633 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) { 1634 struct audit_chunk *chunk; 1635 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode); 1636 if (chunk) { 1637 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) { 1638 drop = chunk; 1639 break; 1640 } 1641 } 1642 } 1643 parent = d->d_parent; 1644 if (parent == d) 1645 break; 1646 d = parent; 1647 } 1648 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */ 1649 rcu_read_unlock(); 1650 if (!drop) { 1651 /* just a race with rename */ 1652 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1653 goto retry; 1654 } 1655 audit_put_chunk(drop); 1656 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) { 1657 /* OK, got more space */ 1658 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1659 goto retry; 1660 } 1661 /* too bad */ 1662 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n"); 1663 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count); 1664 audit_set_auditable(context); 1665 return; 1666 } 1667 rcu_read_unlock(); 1668#endif 1669} 1670 1671static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context, 1672 unsigned char type) 1673{ 1674 struct audit_names *aname; 1675 1676 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) { 1677 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count]; 1678 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname)); 1679 } else { 1680 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS); 1681 if (!aname) 1682 return NULL; 1683 aname->should_free = true; 1684 } 1685 1686 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1; 1687 aname->type = type; 1688 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list); 1689 1690 context->name_count++; 1691 return aname; 1692} 1693 1694/** 1695 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry 1696 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname 1697 * 1698 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an 1699 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename 1700 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL. 1701 */ 1702struct filename * 1703__audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr) 1704{ 1705 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1706 struct audit_names *n; 1707 1708 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1709 if (!n->name) 1710 continue; 1711 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) { 1712 n->name->refcnt++; 1713 return n->name; 1714 } 1715 } 1716 return NULL; 1717} 1718 1719/** 1720 * audit_getname - add a name to the list 1721 * @name: name to add 1722 * 1723 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. 1724 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). 1725 */ 1726void __audit_getname(struct filename *name) 1727{ 1728 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1729 struct audit_names *n; 1730 1731 if (!context->in_syscall) 1732 return; 1733 1734 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); 1735 if (!n) 1736 return; 1737 1738 n->name = name; 1739 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 1740 name->aname = n; 1741 name->refcnt++; 1742 1743 if (!context->pwd.dentry) 1744 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd); 1745} 1746 1747/** 1748 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup 1749 * @name: name being audited 1750 * @dentry: dentry being audited 1751 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry 1752 */ 1753void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry, 1754 unsigned int flags) 1755{ 1756 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1757 const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 1758 struct audit_names *n; 1759 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT; 1760 1761 if (!context->in_syscall) 1762 return; 1763 1764 if (!name) 1765 goto out_alloc; 1766 1767 /* 1768 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can 1769 * just use it directly if the type is correct. 1770 */ 1771 n = name->aname; 1772 if (n) { 1773 if (parent) { 1774 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || 1775 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 1776 goto out; 1777 } else { 1778 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) 1779 goto out; 1780 } 1781 } 1782 1783 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1784 if (n->ino) { 1785 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */ 1786 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino || 1787 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev) 1788 continue; 1789 } else if (n->name) { 1790 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */ 1791 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name)) 1792 continue; 1793 } else 1794 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */ 1795 continue; 1796 1797 /* match the correct record type */ 1798 if (parent) { 1799 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT || 1800 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 1801 goto out; 1802 } else { 1803 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT) 1804 goto out; 1805 } 1806 } 1807 1808out_alloc: 1809 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */ 1810 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN); 1811 if (!n) 1812 return; 1813 if (name) { 1814 n->name = name; 1815 name->refcnt++; 1816 } 1817 1818out: 1819 if (parent) { 1820 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 1821 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; 1822 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN) 1823 n->hidden = true; 1824 } else { 1825 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 1826 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL; 1827 } 1828 handle_path(dentry); 1829 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode); 1830} 1831 1832void __audit_file(const struct file *file) 1833{ 1834 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0); 1835} 1836 1837/** 1838 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects 1839 * @parent: inode of dentry parent 1840 * @dentry: dentry being audited 1841 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for 1842 * 1843 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode 1844 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. 1845 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. 1846 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after 1847 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object 1848 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during 1849 * unsuccessful attempts. 1850 */ 1851void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent, 1852 const struct dentry *dentry, 1853 const unsigned char type) 1854{ 1855 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 1856 const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); 1857 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name; 1858 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL; 1859 1860 if (!context->in_syscall) 1861 return; 1862 1863 if (inode) 1864 handle_one(inode); 1865 1866 /* look for a parent entry first */ 1867 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1868 if (!n->name || 1869 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT && 1870 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) 1871 continue; 1872 1873 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev && 1874 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, 1875 n->name->name, n->name_len)) { 1876 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 1877 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT; 1878 found_parent = n; 1879 break; 1880 } 1881 } 1882 1883 /* is there a matching child entry? */ 1884 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) { 1885 /* can only match entries that have a name */ 1886 if (!n->name || 1887 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) 1888 continue; 1889 1890 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) || 1891 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, 1892 found_parent ? 1893 found_parent->name_len : 1894 AUDIT_NAME_FULL)) { 1895 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) 1896 n->type = type; 1897 found_child = n; 1898 break; 1899 } 1900 } 1901 1902 if (!found_parent) { 1903 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */ 1904 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT); 1905 if (!n) 1906 return; 1907 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent); 1908 } 1909 1910 if (!found_child) { 1911 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type); 1912 if (!found_child) 1913 return; 1914 1915 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent 1916 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in 1917 * audit_free_names() */ 1918 if (found_parent) { 1919 found_child->name = found_parent->name; 1920 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL; 1921 found_child->name->refcnt++; 1922 } 1923 } 1924 1925 if (inode) 1926 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode); 1927 else 1928 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1; 1929} 1930EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child); 1931 1932/** 1933 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values 1934 * @ctx: audit_context for the task 1935 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context 1936 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context 1937 * 1938 * Also sets the context as auditable. 1939 */ 1940int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, 1941 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) 1942{ 1943 if (!ctx->in_syscall) 1944 return 0; 1945 if (!ctx->serial) 1946 ctx->serial = audit_serial(); 1947 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; 1948 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; 1949 *serial = ctx->serial; 1950 if (!ctx->prio) { 1951 ctx->prio = 1; 1952 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; 1953 } 1954 return 1; 1955} 1956 1957/* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */ 1958static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0); 1959 1960static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid) 1961{ 1962 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */ 1963 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current)) 1964 return 0; 1965 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/ 1966 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE)) 1967 return -EPERM; 1968 /* it is set, you need permission */ 1969 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) 1970 return -EPERM; 1971 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */ 1972 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid)) 1973 return -EPERM; 1974 return 0; 1975} 1976 1977static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, 1978 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid, 1979 int rc) 1980{ 1981 struct audit_buffer *ab; 1982 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid; 1983 1984 if (!audit_enabled) 1985 return; 1986 1987 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current)); 1988 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid); 1989 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid), 1990 1991 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); 1992 if (!ab) 1993 return; 1994 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid); 1995 audit_log_task_context(ab); 1996 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d", 1997 oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc); 1998 audit_log_end(ab); 1999} 2000 2001/** 2002 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid 2003 * @loginuid: loginuid value 2004 * 2005 * Returns 0. 2006 * 2007 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). 2008 */ 2009int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid) 2010{ 2011 struct task_struct *task = current; 2012 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1; 2013 kuid_t oldloginuid; 2014 int rc; 2015 2016 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); 2017 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); 2018 2019 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid); 2020 if (rc) 2021 goto out; 2022 2023 /* are we setting or clearing? */ 2024 if (uid_valid(loginuid)) 2025 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id); 2026 2027 task->sessionid = sessionid; 2028 task->loginuid = loginuid; 2029out: 2030 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc); 2031 return rc; 2032} 2033 2034/** 2035 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open 2036 * @oflag: open flag 2037 * @mode: mode bits 2038 * @attr: queue attributes 2039 * 2040 */ 2041void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr) 2042{ 2043 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2044 2045 if (attr) 2046 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2047 else 2048 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr)); 2049 2050 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag; 2051 context->mq_open.mode = mode; 2052 2053 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN; 2054} 2055 2056/** 2057 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive 2058 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2059 * @msg_len: Message length 2060 * @msg_prio: Message priority 2061 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time 2062 * 2063 */ 2064void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio, 2065 const struct timespec *abs_timeout) 2066{ 2067 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2068 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout; 2069 2070 if (abs_timeout) 2071 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec)); 2072 else 2073 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec)); 2074 2075 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes; 2076 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len; 2077 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio; 2078 2079 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV; 2080} 2081 2082/** 2083 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify 2084 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2085 * @notification: Notification event 2086 * 2087 */ 2088 2089void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification) 2090{ 2091 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2092 2093 if (notification) 2094 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo; 2095 else 2096 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0; 2097 2098 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes; 2099 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY; 2100} 2101 2102/** 2103 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute 2104 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor 2105 * @mqstat: MQ flags 2106 * 2107 */ 2108void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat) 2109{ 2110 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2111 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes; 2112 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat; 2113 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR; 2114} 2115 2116/** 2117 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object 2118 * @ipcp: ipc permissions 2119 * 2120 */ 2121void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) 2122{ 2123 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2124 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; 2125 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; 2126 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; 2127 context->ipc.has_perm = 0; 2128 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); 2129 context->type = AUDIT_IPC; 2130} 2131 2132/** 2133 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions 2134 * @qbytes: msgq bytes 2135 * @uid: msgq user id 2136 * @gid: msgq group id 2137 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) 2138 * 2139 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj(). 2140 */ 2141void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode) 2142{ 2143 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2144 2145 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes; 2146 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid; 2147 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid; 2148 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode; 2149 context->ipc.has_perm = 1; 2150} 2151 2152void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) 2153{ 2154 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2155 2156 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE; 2157 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc; 2158} 2159 2160 2161/** 2162 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall 2163 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS. 2164 * @args: args array 2165 * 2166 */ 2167int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) 2168{ 2169 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2170 2171 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args) 2172 return -EINVAL; 2173 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; 2174 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs; 2175 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); 2176 return 0; 2177} 2178 2179/** 2180 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair 2181 * @fd1: the first file descriptor 2182 * @fd2: the second file descriptor 2183 * 2184 */ 2185void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2) 2186{ 2187 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2188 context->fds[0] = fd1; 2189 context->fds[1] = fd2; 2190} 2191 2192/** 2193 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto 2194 * @len: data length in user space 2195 * @a: data address in kernel space 2196 * 2197 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. 2198 */ 2199int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) 2200{ 2201 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2202 2203 if (!context->sockaddr) { 2204 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL); 2205 if (!p) 2206 return -ENOMEM; 2207 context->sockaddr = p; 2208 } 2209 2210 context->sockaddr_len = len; 2211 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len); 2212 return 0; 2213} 2214 2215void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) 2216{ 2217 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2218 2219 context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t); 2220 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2221 context->target_uid = task_uid(t); 2222 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2223 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid); 2224 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2225} 2226 2227/** 2228 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem 2229 * @sig: signal value 2230 * @t: task being signaled 2231 * 2232 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) 2233 * and uid that is doing that. 2234 */ 2235int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) 2236{ 2237 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp; 2238 struct task_struct *tsk = current; 2239 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context; 2240 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t); 2241 2242 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) { 2243 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) { 2244 audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk); 2245 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid)) 2246 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid; 2247 else 2248 audit_sig_uid = uid; 2249 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid); 2250 } 2251 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context()) 2252 return 0; 2253 } 2254 2255 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly 2256 * in audit_context */ 2257 if (!ctx->target_pid) { 2258 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t); 2259 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2260 ctx->target_uid = t_uid; 2261 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2262 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid); 2263 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2264 return 0; 2265 } 2266 2267 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids; 2268 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) { 2269 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC); 2270 if (!axp) 2271 return -ENOMEM; 2272 2273 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID; 2274 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids; 2275 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp; 2276 } 2277 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS); 2278 2279 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t); 2280 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t); 2281 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; 2282 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t); 2283 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); 2284 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); 2285 axp->pid_count++; 2286 2287 return 0; 2288} 2289 2290/** 2291 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps 2292 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed 2293 * @new: the proposed new credentials 2294 * @old: the old credentials 2295 * 2296 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not 2297 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall 2298 * 2299 * -Eric 2300 */ 2301int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, 2302 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2303{ 2304 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax; 2305 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2306 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; 2307 2308 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL); 2309 if (!ax) 2310 return -ENOMEM; 2311 2312 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS; 2313 ax->d.next = context->aux; 2314 context->aux = (void *)ax; 2315 2316 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); 2317 2318 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted; 2319 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable; 2320 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE); 2321 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT; 2322 2323 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted; 2324 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable; 2325 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective; 2326 2327 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2328 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable; 2329 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2330 return 0; 2331} 2332 2333/** 2334 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall 2335 * @new: the new credentials 2336 * @old: the old (current) credentials 2337 * 2338 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the 2339 * audit system if applicable 2340 */ 2341void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) 2342{ 2343 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2344 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current); 2345 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective; 2346 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective; 2347 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted; 2348 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET; 2349} 2350 2351void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags) 2352{ 2353 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; 2354 context->mmap.fd = fd; 2355 context->mmap.flags = flags; 2356 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP; 2357} 2358 2359static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab) 2360{ 2361 kuid_t auid, uid; 2362 kgid_t gid; 2363 unsigned int sessionid; 2364 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; 2365 2366 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current); 2367 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); 2368 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid); 2369 2370 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u", 2371 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid), 2372 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), 2373 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid), 2374 sessionid); 2375 audit_log_task_context(ab); 2376 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current)); 2377 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current)); 2378 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm); 2379} 2380 2381/** 2382 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally 2383 * @signr: signal value 2384 * 2385 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we 2386 * should record the event for investigation. 2387 */ 2388void audit_core_dumps(long signr) 2389{ 2390 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2391 2392 if (!audit_enabled) 2393 return; 2394 2395 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */ 2396 return; 2397 2398 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND); 2399 if (unlikely(!ab)) 2400 return; 2401 audit_log_task(ab); 2402 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr); 2403 audit_log_end(ab); 2404} 2405 2406void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code) 2407{ 2408 struct audit_buffer *ab; 2409 2410 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP); 2411 if (unlikely(!ab)) 2412 return; 2413 audit_log_task(ab); 2414 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x", 2415 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(), 2416 KSTK_EIP(current), code); 2417 audit_log_end(ab); 2418} 2419 2420struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void) 2421{ 2422 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; 2423 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall)) 2424 return NULL; 2425 return &ctx->killed_trees; 2426} 2427